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Abstract
Increasing recognition of the irrefutable urgency to address the global climate challenge is driving
mitigation efforts to decarbonise. Countries are setting targets, technological innovation is
making renewable energy sources competitive and fossil fuel actors are leveraging their incum-
bent privilege and political reach to modulate energy transitions. As techno-economic compet-
itiveness is rapidly reconfigured in favour of sources such as solar energy, governance puzzles
dominate the research frontier. Who makes key decisions about decarbonisation based on what
metrics, and how are consequent benefits and burdens allocated? This article takes its point of
departure in ambitious sustainability metrics for solar rollout that Portugal embraced in the late
2010s. This southwestern European country leads on hydro and wind power, and recently
emerged from austerity politics after the 2008–2015 recession. Despite Europe’s best solar
irradiation, its big solar push only kicked off in late 2018. In explaining how this arose and
unfolded until mid-2020 and why, the article investigates what key issues ambitious rapid decar-
bonisation plans must address to enhance social equity. It combines attention to accountability
and legitimacy to offer an analytical framework geared at generating actionable knowledge to
advance an accountable energy transition. Drawing on empirical study of the contingencies that
determine the implementation of sustainability metrics, the article traces how discrete acts
legitimate specific trajectories of territorialisation by solar photovoltaics through discursive,
bureaucratic, technocratic and financial practices. Combining empirics and perspectives from
political ecology and energy geographies, it probes the politics of just energy transitions to
more low-carbon and equitable societal futures.
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Sustainability metrics and transition politics
Metrics are not the outcome of a struggle once it is over. They are simultaneously tools and
products, the ends we seek to fashion and the means through which we try to fashion them.
As noted by Loconto and Hatanaka (2018: 427), ‘metrics and assessments are difficult to
disentangle from each other and from the definition of sustainability’. Hence, to unpack
metrics is to shed light on successful but contingent arguments. They are successful because
metrics are ‘systems of measurement privileged as standards’ (Sareen, 2020a: 31) that rep-
resent an accretion of recognition that a particular object and type of measurement is
legitimate, e.g. as a measure of sustainability defined in a very specific way. They are con-
tingent because this recognition is itself premised on social legitimacy, and legitimation
refers to dynamic practices always in the making. Indeed, Pallesen (2016: 528) highlights
‘the plurality of conceptions and metrics of value across different spheres’ as a core concern
of valuation studies.
Approaching sustainability transitions through metrics elides ‘success’ with durability.
Durability is not always the goal in relation to sustainability; for instance, local sustainabil-
ity transition initiatives can be successful without being durable (Aiken, 2017; Madanipour,
2017). Yet when the referent is metrics, i.e. standardised systems of measurement, durability
becomes an essential component of how success is defined. What purpose can a standard
serve if it keeps changing? The flip side of such an argument is that standards must change; if
a metric is not adaptive, it may fail to retain relevance, e.g. as a sector evolves rapidly and
makes recalibration necessary (Lippert, 2015). Here, ‘contingency’ relates closely to adap-
tiveness. A system of measurement that is socially legitimated as a suitable standard has by
definition adapted, in a recursive dance with an evolving sector. In the phrasing of Jensen
et al. (2017: 460), ‘the way in which sociotechnical systems are acted upon (or governed) is
inextricably linked to the epistemic practices through which a system is made visible’.
Moreover, as Bowker and Star (1999) famously pointed out, who is able to define and
measure is a political matter. It is well established, then, that both the means of measuring
socio-technical change, and socio-technical change itself, advance through entanglement.
Such a dynamic, reflexive understanding of metrics and socio-technical transitions does
not square easily with structural accounts. This is not to gainsay structural approaches;
institutional fixity matters and so does path dependence (see Cherp et al., 2018; Geels, 2004).
Rather, I suggest that metrics present a distinctive analytical point of entry into understand-
ing the workings of socio-technical change in temporal sync with its societal effects. Star
(1999: 377) refers to this as ‘pinpointing the epistemological status of indicators’. A key
shortcoming of structural approaches is that they largely treat formal aspects (such as
institutions) as a given. As institutions and the sectors they govern change, there is great
analytical purchase in adopting a relational approach over a structural one (Bouzarovski
and Haarstad, 2019; Clemens and Cook, 1999). A concern with the politics of implemen-
tation of metrics constitutes a relational approach to change (Mahoney and Thelen, 2009),
focused on the act of institutionalisation at moments of flux. Heinrichs and Schuster (2017:
541) find that metrics and indicators are the most developed elements of institutionalising
sustainability within governance apparatus, making these an apt locus of investigation.
Contemporary transitions to low-carbon energy systems mark an extended historical
moment of flux, where accelerated change is called for, and low-carbon technologies such
as solar photovoltaics (PV) have become rapidly affordable and widely available at scale.
Scholarship on energy metrics has focused on target-setting for ambitious climate action
(e.g. Krabbe et al., 2015), and on measuring progress in relation to targets for, e.g. increas-
ing renewable energy capacity and reducing the use of fossil fuel sources (Szarka, 2016;
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Walenta, 2020). Yet there are increasingly cases where ambitious targets have already been
set, and where it is not yet possible to quantify progress in meeting them – e.g. National
Energy and Climate Plans 2030 by European Union member states. These demand a more
relational approach, so as to gain insights on how sustainability metrics are being imple-
mented (Nerini et al., 2018). Ex post evaluations of whether metrics were successful are of
little use – we cannot afford to fail to achieve ambitious climate targets due to the great cost
to planetary wellbeing (Biermann et al., 2012; Hale et al., 2020). Rather, there is need for
ongoing assessment of socio-technical change in relation to sustainability metrics that have
been socially legitimated as necessary to avoid climate breakdown. This implies addressing
the politics of how sustainability metrics are implemented, i.e. the accountability of sustain-
ability metrics when transitions are underway. What possibilities does this open up, what
possibilities does it close down (Stirling, 2008), and for which actors?
In this article, I examine what happens when sustainability metrics have been put in place
by a formal authority, and the hard work of implementing a socio-technical transition gets
underway, in the national context of Portugal. This is a question of institutionalising sus-
tainability metrics in order to materialise low-carbon transitions. Political commitment is
tested, technical challenges need to be handled and finance must be secured by new entrants.
I use the case of solar energy rollout in Portugal from October 2018 until August 2020. This
captures the dynamics around the emergence and early functioning of a new ministry in the
energy sector, an instance of massive institutional change, and the promulgation of ambi-
tious sustainability metrics for rapid solar rollout during the 2020s, backed by new mech-
anisms for implementation, including two sets of large-scale solar auctions. Such metrics
legitimate the territorialisation of space for specific purposes – solar plants – but there is still
discretion in how territorialisation is configured. For instance, land use changes are noto-
riously fraught with contestation, low-carbon transitions notwithstanding (e.g. Kiesecker
and Naugle, 2017). Who makes key decisions about decarbonisation based on what metrics,
and how are consequent benefits and burdens allocated? As I argue below, studying the
politics of implementation of metrics can yield a timely understanding of these issues. At
stake is a matter of interest to scholars of critical renewabilities: how the legitimating power
of metrics of low-carbon transitions impacts social equity in issues such as energy access and
land use change.
I proceed as follows. The next section integrates a conceptual anchoring in scholarship on
legitimacy and accountability and then presents the methodology, which combines two
analytical frameworks with the aim of producing actionable knowledge. Then, a back-
ground section elaborates the case of solar rollout in Portugal leading up to the study
period. The next section presents results on the implementation of metrics and transition
politics in the case study during October 2018 to August 2020. These are thereafter discussed
in terms of the accountability relations and practices of legitimation that undergird the
implementation of these sustainability metrics. The final section offers policy insights and
concluding reflections on the potential and scope of such an approach.
From accountability analysis to evidence-based energy policy insights
Starting more than a decade ago (Biermann and Gupta, 2011; Black, 2008), research on
accountability and legitimacy has undergone a relational turn. Established scholarship on
these concepts from further back stems mainly from political scientists and to a lesser extent
from development studies, and tends to focus on structural mechanisms. Accountability is
treated as vertical or horizontal, with relationships between actors understood in relation to
specific institutional structures. Neoinstitutional theory has problematised static accounts of
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institutions, pointing out that institutions themselves change (Mahoney and Thelen, 2009),
and working towards examination of accountability relations in a more dynamic sense
(B€ackstrand et al., 2010). For instance, Kramarz and Park (2017: 4) argue for conceptualis-
ing accountability as ‘a reflection of choices within relationships of obligation between
decision makers and takers’. This marks a shift in focus away from institutional structures
– even shifting ones – as the frame of reference, and towards understanding changing
relations of accountability between actors as constitutive of sociotechnical change.
Human geographers inspired by work on actor networks (Rutherford and Coutard,
2014) and sociologists working with Bourdieusian ‘configuring fields’ approaches
(Stirling, 2019) have developed approaches that take point of departure in the relationships
between changing fields of actors. Bridge (2018) identifies a ‘relational turn’ in human
geography with regard to an increasing interest in studying large, rapid sectoral changes
linked with low-carbon transitions. While accountability scholarship has been slow to adopt
such a relational approach, legitimacy has been increasingly foregrounded, perhaps as it
lends itself explicitly to empirical investigation of relational aspects. Indeed, B€ackstrand
et al. (2018: 340) argue for greater attention to ‘the legitimacy challenges posed by the
twin issues of representation and inclusion (who should be part of decision-making
bodies in various networks?) and accountability (to whom should such bodies be account-
able and how?)’.
Continuity from neoinstitutional theory to legitimacy can be traced through the prom-
inent emergent focus on polycentric governance, notably by climate change scholars, as an
accurate descriptor of institutions with overlapping domains of authority during sectoral
change, which raises questions of institutional legitimacy (see, e.g. Jordan et al., 2015;
Sovacool and Van de Graaf, 2018). Another long-running strand comes from development
studies’ in-depth investigation of power relations, and which ones are legitimated in order to
constitute authority (e.g. Cleaver, 2002; Sikor and Lund, 2009). For instance, Lund (2016)
analyses competing efforts to legitimate power towards distinct configurations of institu-
tional authority, with significant implications for resource allocation, and thus for who
benefits from change.
Yet the twin concepts, accountability and legitimacy, have rarely been analytically oper-
ationalised in conjunction in a relational approach. While scholars of accountability and
legitimacy have noted this lacuna and called for such analyses (e.g. Biermann and Gupta,
2011; Kramarz and Park, 2016), it is only recently that relational frameworks in this direc-
tion have been proposed at scales other than the global. An accountability analysis frame-
work foregrounds the following concern: are decisions based on deliberative assessment, and
are they backed by sanctions or not? The framework uses the resultant 2 2 matrix to posit
four types of accountability relations: strong and hollow relations of accountability, or
authoritarian and libertarian relations (Sareen and Wolf, 2020).
Another framework mainframes legitimacy in a relational sense, as ‘practices of legiti-
mation’. Sareen (2020a: 15) proposes four such practices: discursive, bureaucratic, techno-
cratic and financial. The emergence of this framework is responsive to calls for increased
attention to sectoral changes at sub-national levels (Cowell et al., 2017; Padt et al., 2014),
where many of the activities of low-carbon transitions take place, while the focus has long
been on the national and global debates that have been critiqued for having had limited
impact on real-world change. The focus on practices aims to empirically examine legitima-
tion as discrete relational phenomena constituted by actors engaged in sectoral change at the
sub-national level, in regions and cities. Unlike structural approaches that are limited by a
fixity of institutions (Mahoney and Thelen, 2009), a focus on legitimation is sensitive to
informal power dynamics, as it captures endeavours to legitimate power, while their success
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is still contingent. Thus, this approach is equipped to study institutional authority in the
making. This is a strength for the engaged study of rapid sectoral change.
This paper combines these two frameworks for the first time, in order to benefit from
both their strengths and generate actionable knowledge. The accountability framework can
be critiqued for mainly categorising changing accountability relations, without suggesting a
clear path forward to enable low-carbon transitions. The practices of legitimation can be
critiqued for identifying a large set of practices without conveying a sense of what the
assemblage of these reconfigured relationships implies for the nature of overall change in
a given sector. As Stirling (2019) argues, researchers are themselves embedded actors in low-
carbon transitions, and risk embodying incumbency in their own outlook. Others have
called for ‘sustainability collectives’ of researchers to produce actionable knowledge for a
just transition (Care et al., 2021). Combining these frameworks, I propose, can address
precisely this need, by identifying specific practices of legitimation and characterising
them in terms of the sort of accountability relations that they constitute, in a manner
that provides a place-specific and policy-relevant output to influence sectoral change.
Table 1 provides a generic overview of the contribution the framework can make to action-
able knowledge.
While the approach proposed in Table 1 combines the accountability framework of
Sareen and Wolf (2020) and the practices of legitimation of Sareen (2020a), its output is
distinct from both these frameworks, and aimed at informing and influencing real-world
change more directly and to a greater extent. Such a move beyond analytical characterisa-
tion of broader sectoral change on the one hand, and of specific practices on the other hand,
towards a place-based and policy-relevant account of legitimating power in practice, is both
timely and of interest to scholars of accountability and legitimacy as well as sustainability
transitions (see, e.g. Kern and Rogge, 2018).
Mapping accountability relations during a sectoral transition like solar rollout constitutes
a basis to identify and critique practices of legitimation as contributing to a low-carbon
transition or not, and enhancing social equity or not, within a bounded territory such as
Portugal in this article. Unpacking the politics of implementing sustainability metrics helps
to characterise the particular social values that undergird the solar rollout, by studying the
manner in which these metrics are enacted and how such change is legitimated. This means
that accountability may empirically vary from Portugal’s formal commitment to a rapid
low-carbon transition through solar energy rollout, because informal practices betray a lack
of support for such a transition, for instance delaying solar plants for financial speculation.
Alternatively, solar rollout may cater to the interests of particular well-positioned actors at
the cost of others, thus enabling a rapid low-carbon transition while exacerbating social
equity. The embodiment of transition politics in the actual implementation of sustainability
Table 1. From accountability analysis to actionable knowledge for just transitions.
LASH matrix Sanctions No sanctions
Deliberative
assessment
(S) -> Support and replicate
discrete practices of legitimation
(H) -> Challenge and mobilise
discrete practices of legitimation
No deliberative
assessment
(A) -> Criticise and metricise
discrete practices of legitimation
(L) -> Regulate and democratise
discrete practices of legitimation
L: laissez faire tendencies; A: authoritarianism; S: strong accountability; H: hollow accountability.
Source: combination and adaptation of Sareen and Wolf (2020) and Sareen (2020a).
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metrics serves as a window onto the reconfiguration of ‘legitimating power’ – the power to
influence accountability relations – in a changing field of actors in the energy sector.
Methods and empirical material
I collected data by interviewing 80 experts with insights on Portugal’s solar energy rollout,
during 2017–2019. Interviewees included solar energy researchers, representatives of energy
companies, national authorities including the regulator and energy ministry, representatives
of interest bodies such as energy associations, sub-national authorities at the regional and
municipal scale, community energy enthusiasts, solar energy financiers, staff of a solar
energy cooperative and energy journalists (see Table 2). Interviews were conducted on a
generic institutional attribution basis to facilitate greater openness of the interviewees and
safeguard against any adverse effects to them in a tightly-networked and rapidly-evolving
sector, hence specific energy companies are not specified in quotes, while for unique national
authorities such as the sectoral ministry and regulator, staff identities are not disclosed.
I also conducted multi-sited field observation (e.g. at solar plants and energy sector
events) during five months of fieldwork in Portugal over 2017–2019. This was comple-
mented by desk study focused on developments until August 2020.1 A field visit scheduled
for April 2020 was cancelled due to global pandemic-related travel restrictions, but it was
possible to attend some events and meetings that were moved online due to this disruption
during summer 2020. This ensured as much empirical purchase as possible. A second solar
auction, completed in August 2020, marks a natural concluding point for the empirical
analysis.
Establishing sustainability metrics for solar rollout in Portugal
In October 2018, Portugal instituted a new Ministry of Environment and Energy Transition,
marking a historic shift of the energy portfolio away from the Ministry of Economy. By
January 2019, Portugal had launched a Roadmap for Carbon Neutrality 2050 and published
its draft National Energy and Climate Plan 2030. With the incumbent political coalition
winning the national election that year, the new ministry changed name to the Ministry for
the Environment and Climate Action, maintaining a Secretary of State for Energy. With this
succession of rapid changes, a country that has steadily moved away from fossil fuel depen-
dence (Krajacic et al., 2011) – first with hydropower starting in the 1980s and then with wind
power from the late 1990s onwards (Bento and Fontes, 2015) – looked set to enter the 2020s
with an ambitious intent for climate action. Portugal’s wind power rollout marks a recent
Table 2. Overview of stakeholders interviewed by type.
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and remarkable energy transition, growing from 58 megawatts (MW) in 1999 to 4364MW
in 2011, and achieving an annual penetration of 24% of electricity production by 2017, when
installed wind capacity stood at 5313MW (Bento and Fontes, 2015; Costa et al., 2019).
Along with the continued expansion of wind power and the introduction of green hydrogen
for low-carbon mobility transitions, the country with Europe’s highest rate of solar irradi-
ation envisaged significant near-future solar energy growth. While increasing its installed
solar capacity from 585MW in 2017 to 1035MW in 2020 (DGEG, 2020), Portugal expected
to rapidly expand this to 9 gigawatts (GW) during the 2020s.2
Yet this turn of events was anything but apparent until a scandal in Portugal’s defence
ministry set a cabinet reshuffle in motion in October 2018, a year ahead of the national
elections, as the first step in a cascade of changes with significance for the national energy
policy, notably for its solar energy rollout.
Some years prior to this period, Portugal underwent austerity politics during the financial
recession of 2008–2015, with renewable energy subsidies becoming politically unpopular
during the early 2010s. A pro-renewables Socialist Party-led coalition, ousted by the
Social Democrats during their 2011–2015 term in government, returned to power in 2015,
and won the national elections in October 2019. During 2015–2018, political and adminis-
trative enthusiasm for solar energy remained lukewarm, with solar developers stuck queuing
for solar licenses. Despite techno-economic promise with solar PV costs falling globally, the
regulatory and political line was not yet altogether promising for solar industry actors in
Portugal. Yet, with the formation of the new ministry, the declaration of ambitious solar
targets, and the consolidation of another term in government, 2020 presented a radically
altered outlook. Most significant for this shift was the success of the 1.35GW solar auctions
conducted by Portugal in July 2019. These set a new world record low solar bid at the time,
and resulted in a very competitive average price across all 24 auctioned lots. At just over e20
per megawatt hour (MWh), the average solar tariff compared favourably with the e55–57
per MWh annual average price on the Iberian wholesale market for electricity in Portugal
and Spain. This was further improved upon by another world record set during the August
2020 solar auctions, which fetched even lower average prices and created considerable
debate among solar industry analysts.3
The solar rollout background in Portugal until October 2018 has been analysed in terms
of accountability, metrics and practices of legitimation (Sareen, 2020b). In this article, the
point of departure is how metrics of sustainability, once in place, are implemented during
solar energy rollout. Conceptually, I am interested in a combined understanding of account-
ability and legitimacy in the governance of this component of Portugal’s sustainability
transition. Empirically, I focus on the politics around metrics during the rollout. Who is
able to bring particular metrics to bear, in which manner (through practices of legitimation),
and with what implications for the underlying regime of accountability that determines the
implementation of a low-carbon transition? Once the state has articulated a clear vision for
the direction of progress in the solar energy sector, how are the associated metrics mobilised
in various forms to institutionalise the practices this vision legitimates?
The next section presents findings on the practices of legitimation of solar rollout in
particular ways from October 2018, when the new ministry was formed, until August
2020, when a second set of solar auctions for 700MW was concluded. The subsequent
section categorises and discusses these practices in terms of accountability relations. This
paves the way for some policy insights in the conclusion, along with reflections on applying
the approach.
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Solar rollout metrics and practices of legitimation (October 2018 to
August 2020)
Here, I draw on specific practices that legitimated the way that solar rollout took place from
October 2018 onwards. These are related to solar licenses, electric transmission grid invest-
ments, the first solar auction (July 2019), large power purchase agreements (PPAs), foreign
investment, community energy, prominent solar energy sector events hosted in Portugal and
a second solar auction (August 2020). The practices are organised using the four-fold typol-
ogy of the practices of legitimation framework from mentioned above (Sareen 2020a).
Discursive legitimation
The important role for solar energy envisaged in the National Energy and Climate Plan 2030
– targeting up to 9GW of solar PV (and modest amounts of other solar generation tech-
nologies including concentrating solar power) for electricity by 2030 – was a key metric.
The plan drew on a range of inputs based on existing technologies and energy sector exper-
tise, including from researchers involved in energy modelling, renewable energy associations
and global players. As one of the researchers involved stated during an interview on 1
March 2019:
Whereas the Drawdown project used existing available data and did a meta-analysis based on
chosen most promising technologies to deliver a portfolio, here we created ‘new data’ to get
results for Portugal. This is what the International Energy Agency and World Energy Outlook
use, but we do it at the country level. We have validated a lot of things, so public stakeholders
are confident, because we engage with stakeholders such as EDP [Energias de Portugal] and
cement manufacturers. We have done a set of sector-specific workshops to understand their
problems and integrate them in our modelling.
The Ministry of Environment and Energy Transition undertook a road show in early 2019
to profile this plan nationwide, beyond the capital Lisbon to Porto in the north and Faro in
the south. The plan was complemented by a Roadmap for Carbon Neutrality 2050, which
placed the ambitions until 2030 in a longer-term perspective of moving to a society with a
net-zero carbon footprint by 2050. As part of the road show in Faro on 27 February 2019,
the Director General of Energy and Geology presented a Venn diagram to highlight the
overlap between the roadmap for 2050, the plan for 2030 and the National Investment Plan
2030, emphasising the feasible and coordinated ‘grand project structure’. A focus on low-
carbon electricity source transitions was supplemented by plans for low-carbon interven-
tions in other sectors responsible for high emissions: transportation and mobility, waste,
agriculture, forests and land use. The roadmap situated metrics for these interventions
within three multi-faceted aspects: socio-economic scenarios, circular economy and societal
participation.
The anticipation generated by the plan and roadmap was backed up by the announce-
ment of Portugal’s first solar energy auction, which took place in July 2019. Thus, the
auction was one of the first concrete efforts to implement the plan. Pitched at 1.35GW,
it was big for the country (twice its installed solar capacity at the time) but small on a global
scale. It attracted global attention, however, when it set a new world record for the lowest
tariff, with a lot auctioned at below e15 per MWh. Within months, announcements of
additional solar projects based on PPAs followed. During 2019, Lisbon became a hotspot
within Europe to host solar energy conferences and events. These ranged from big industry
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fairs like Large Scale Solar Europe to global network events such as Solar Cities, as well as
national events such as Solar Market Parity Portugal, an Energy Forum, and a Sun Day.4
To quote the Secretary of State for Energy at the Energy Forum on 16 July 2019: ‘Solar will
help not only decarbonise but also bring down sectoral costs and benefit the consumer’
(author’s translation). The discursive emphasis at these events was on large-scale solar PV
plants, not surprising given the billions of Euro pouring into this sectoral segment. Small-
scale solar PV was in focus at smaller workshops, such as those involving the solar energy
cooperative Coopernico, the Lisboa Enova municipal agency of energy and environment in
Lisbon, and the Lisbon-based PROsumers for the Energy Union project funded by the
European Commission.5
By 2020, solar energy was clearly legitimated as a rapidly growing sector in Portugal, a
distinct change from October 2018, up to which its fortunes were regarded with greater
uncertainty (for summary statistics on growth, see DGEG, 2020). Despite the postponement
of the planned second round of solar auctions from spring to August 2020 due to measures
related to the global COVID-19 pandemic, the ministry stuck to its intent to auction
700MW, fetched world record low tariffs again and consolidated Portugal’s solar trajectory
in line with recently institutionalised energy policy ambitions in the 2030 plan.
Bureaucratic legitimation
The mode of bureaucratic legitimation for solar plants changed drastically shortly after
October 2018. Solar developers had been queueing for solar licenses, with a build-up of
over 2GW in license applications, and indications of much more limited available capacity
on the electric grid from the Directorate General for Energy and Geology. The newly
formed ministry worked to resolve all pending applications as quickly as possible, most
notably stopping any further extensions of licenses where developers had overshot the orig-
inally allocated deadline to install solar capacity. This move was welcomed by most solar
developers, who had been complaining about the rise of speculative investment, which was
driving up sectoral costs as actors acquired solar licenses and held on to them while their
value rose, without installing solar plants. As a renewable energy association representative
stated when interviewed on 7 August 2018: ‘There are frequent changes of ownership for the
same solar park, for example [name redacted]. This is not a traditional energy sector practice
and it is speculative and bad for business’.
With the solar licensing backlog resolved, the ministry chose solar auctions as a process
to gain a clearer sense of actually interested solar developers and to determine a competitive
price for new solar plants. As a ministry representative interviewed on 7 March 2019
emphasised: ‘Pushing on solar auctions is very hard. That has needed several legislative
adjustments. Earlier projects had done due diligence on EIA [environmental impact assess-
ment] and technology, but failed at the bottleneck of grid capacity constraints’. The repre-
sentative described consideration of multiple auction designs, and emphasised that besides
reflecting global developments in reverse e-auction designs, their choices were informed by
consultations with stakeholders interested in the sector in Portugal. Thus, this preparatory
phase marks a rejigging of institutional structures in a manner responsive to changing
realities and emerging targets.
Industrial actors again welcomed this development: a market-based competitive mecha-
nism such as solar auctions to set solar tariffs for 15 years (as per the auction design) enabled
developers to avail finance at competitive rates from financial institutions that were familiar
with this modality for risk management. Registrations for the first solar auctions attracted
300 solar developers, and the available grid capacity was pre-specified and divided into 24
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lots, bringing new transparency into the process. Developers could thus register interest to
bid on specific lots, and get talks underway for greenfield development in those areas, e.g.
for land acquisition, environmental impact assessment, project finance and solar PV module
procurement based on the envisaged plant size. They were also assured grid access in case of
a successful bid. This front-loaded supply side approach eased the planning horizon for
industrial actors and attributed more legitimacy to the solar sector in the eyes of key players
such as foreign investors. A foreign investor interviewed on 17 July 2019 reflected that:
It is very hard to get the right amount at the right price at a given time. Such a step as Portugal
has taken with the solar auction seems to make sense and it is not always that corporate PPAs
are better, so it is a question of how it is implemented – all the hype around the technology
makes sense given conditions in Iberia. That does raise private sector enthusiasm for solar
investment. But there is the risk of a spillover effect if you overbuild and have misallocated
capital, which is something the private sector can also tend to do itself.
Changes were slower in small-scale solar energy, but underway nonetheless. After a legis-
lative enablement, community energy became feasible on 1 January 2020. Previously, small-
scale solar plants had been limited to self-consumption by a single entity, with grid injection
possible only on relatively unfavourable terms after the early 2010s. The new legislation
made it possible to have a small- to medium-scale plant (in the 10 s and 100 s of Kilo Watts
or KW) with several users consuming or prosuming solar generation (for more details, see
Campos et al., 2020). While the effects of this change are not captured in this study, this
bureaucratic legitimation marks the removal of a key bottleneck, contemporaneously evi-
dent in other European countries, such as France. While not a complex metric, this is an
important one with regard to who owns and uses a solar plant – not necessarily a single
entity but multiple ones. The recognition of this as a standard paves the way for a reconfi-
guration of the scale at which solar rollout takes place, and for economic models such as
energy cooperatives. Indeed, a European Commission funded project ‘Sun4All’ aims to
implement a community solar energy project in Almada municipality near Lisbon during
2021–2024.
Technocratic legitimation
The chief development from late-2018 to mid-2020 was the emergence and refinement of the
solar auction in line with Portugal’s energy sector needs and solar rollout targets. Ahead of
the first solar auction, ministry representatives explained the auction design to me as two-
fold: bidders could compete for the lowest fixed tariff per unit solar electricity sold for
15 years, or offer the highest payment to the grid per unit solar electricity sold at the prev-
alent rate on the wholesale electricity market. This approach was founded in the logic that
grid capacity was limited, and the state was keen to secure competitive bids, given the large
prospective interest from industrial and financial actors in investing in this segment. This
logic was backed up by a ceiling of e45/MWh on fixed solar tariffs, significantly (approx-
imately 20%) below the annual average rate in the Iberian wholesale electricity market.
As the 24 lots proceeded to be auctioned, initial expectations tumbled. Solar developers
interviewed ahead of the auctions stated that they hoped for the tariff to stay above e30/
MWh as a reasonable outcome. One preferred to support others with financing rather than
bidding themselves, stating on 17 July 2019 that: ‘We got solar projects under the old
[subsidised] regime as well as licenses under the initial [unsubsidised during 2017–2018]
regime which have continued to be implemented after the new ministry stepped in. [But]
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we will not participate ourselves in the solar auctions as we do not feel equipped to compete
with others’.
Rather, this developer saw its core strength in facilitating greenfield development. The
representative elaborated: ‘Single window clearance is namesake, a lot of the steps have
simply been moved to the pre-DGEG [Directorate General for Energy and Geology] stage
but still require going to many stakeholders to get clearances’. As the auctions proceeded
with significant participation from foreign investors, the mental threshold of e30/MWh was
rapidly breached, and then bids went below e20/MWh. In the aftermath of the result, one
developer reflected on the past week by stating that they had repeatedly gone back to the
drawing board, reconfigured financial agreements, and established new baselines of what
they as industrial actors saw as financially feasible on the cost side. Interviewed on 30 July
2019, he reflected that:
For our classic business this is not good, it cuts our margins both in our management fees as well
as EPC [engineering, procurement and construction] fees, as well as our premium on the green-
field development, which is our core business model. The business models have completely
changed in these couple of weeks.
The auctions ended without lots going to domestic developers, while European energy
companies (e.g. from Spain) won several lots. The large incumbent in Portugal, Energias
de Portugal, was the sole bidder on one large lot, which was resolved after the auction for a
shade over e20/MWh, in line with the average auction tariff.
Ahead of the second auction for 700MW that took place in August 2020, the ministry
unveiled new auction modalities. When registration for the auction opened, developers had
the option to signal interest in building solar PV plants with storage, to contribute to electric
grid flexibility as the share of intermittent renewable energy sources such as solar energy grew in
the Portuguese electricity mix. This will to identify a new metric (a component of the auctions
for solar-energy-plus-storage) reflected global cost declines in energy storage, and the increas-
ingly explicit valuation of energy flexibility. Additionally, Portuguese energy policy began to
push for green hydrogen as a transport fuel with a target of 1000MW by 2030, and developers
were interested in establishing solar plants that could power the hydrolysis to produce hydrogen
fuel. A renewable energy association representative stated during the Large Scale Solar Digital
conference on 22 May 2020 that: ‘We see that solar PV has two markets now, electricity and
green hydrogen generationwhich is attracting investment.We are gettingmembers whowant to
be grid off-takers who invest in establishing green hydrogen powered by solar PV’. This sectoral
development provides a basis for new metrics to capture a new temporal dimension to the
energy demand side of solar PV during the second auction, a topic for future research highlight-
ed in emerging work on energy flexibility (e.g. Walker, 2021).
Financial legitimation
There were contrastingly scaled developments in terms of financial legitimation. On the
one hand, large-scale solar PV saw costs tumble, and solar developers went down as low
as e15/MWh on fixed tariffs. Some industry experts regarded this as a risky development
that did not reflect the actual cost of solar PV plants. Installing 1MW of solar capacity
requires somewhat less than e1 million, a cost that varies across projects but continues to
decrease (Chase, 2019). But even at the low tariffs emerging in Portugal, there was clearly
continued interest in the large-scale solar PV sector, which the Ministry for the Environment
and Climate Action highlighted as a success. Ahead of the second solar auctions, an energy
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company representative stated during the Large Scale Solar Digital conference on 19 May
2020 that ‘we will see firms doing more EPC as an integrated part of value chains’. During
2019 and 2020, energy companies continued to announce PPAs for solar power in the
hundreds of MW, beyond the solar auctions. This proved that solar power was indeed
competitive on costs for many industrial applications, as suggested by average auction
tariffs of just over e20/MWh – or about 40% the average rates on the wholesale market.6
On the other hand, small-scale solar PV had not yet seen dramatic increases until August
2020. The solar cooperative Coopernico’s crowdfunding offerings continued to be fully
funded rapidly, indicating an appetite for investing in small-scale plants. The impact inves-
ting platform GoParity raised funds for several solar PV projects in Portugal.7 Yet due to a
legislative constraint until 2020, these projects were limited to self-consumption; the study
period cannot capture the effect of the removal of this constraint in January 2020.
Ostensibly, however, community-scale solar energy projects will emerge shortly, in line
with the trend in Europe (Essletzbichler, 2012; Hewitt et al., 2019). Yet metrics for the
potential benefits of such solar plants – optimal use of existing grid capacity, less transmis-
sion losses, more efficient land use, revenue sharing with users, energy flexibility through
demand response (also see Campos et al., 2020) – remained absent in terms of any financial
valuation. Commenting on the presentations at a national energy conference, an energy
cooperative representative reflected on 25 July 2019 that:
Of the large and small scale drivers of solar uptake, the conference had mainly representatives
from big players. We are still not putting the citizen in the centre of the energy transition. . . .
With the new auctions it is clear there is a lot of money in the renewable energy sector and these
players can invest anywhere else, the companies that are here are here to make money. For us it
is about a fair price for energy, and democratisation, which was not present.
This quote underscores that the energy transition targets in Portugal focused primarily on
adding more clean energy capacity. Small-scale solar plants constituted a modest share of
this total, and were not in the limelight.
New community energy legislation did, however, remove the constraint of having to
register as an energy supplier to gain a larger share of benefits from producing solar
energy, an option blocked by high barriers to entry to gain supplier status (Sareen and
Haarstad, 2018). It meant that small-scale solar plant users such as households, who were
previously limited to self-consumption, could participate in a wider array of financial
arrangements for solar prosuming. This presented scope for new metrics to emerge as
well, such as revenue sharing arrangements for community solar energy plants shared by
residential and commercial users with complementary energy use temporalities. Unlike the
headline metrics of the national plans, which suited large-scale solar PV plants for which
modalities like solar auctions were put in place, metrics for small-scale solar plants thus
lagged behind, and had to be developed by local communities of practice. These commu-
nities included actors such as energy cooperatives, municipal agencies and researchers.
These results show how the solar segment of Portugal’s energy sector became a strongly
legitimated concern and began to rigidify. During this period of institutionalisation and
metricisation, top-down actions largely prevailed over bottom-up efforts through legitimat-
ing power, though with some indications of emerging local agency. Some space was ‘opened
up’ while other space was ‘closed down’ (Stirling, 2008) for territorialisation in socio-spatial
patterns and with contrasting temporalities, represented through a limited but growing set
of metrics for the solar energy transition.
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New metrics, changing regimes of accountability?
Here, I discuss the practices elaborated in the empirical analysis above in terms of which
practices embody laissez faire tendencies (no deliberative assessment nor sanctions), author-
itarianism (sanctions without deliberative assessment), strong accountability (deliberative
assessment backed by sanctions) and hollow accountability (no sanctions despite deliberative
assessment). Accordingly, these are plotted into Table 3, which is an empirically populated
version of Table 1 above. For each of the types of accountability relations that undergird
various practices of legitimation, I reflect on what is ‘opened up’ and ‘closed down’ (Stirling,
2008), and on what basis.
Laissez faire tendencies
Commensuration of differently scaled solar plants (financial legitimation). The metrics deployed in
Portugal’s solar energy transition during October 2018 to August 2020 treat solar PV plants
at all scales as similar objects, measured in terms of MW contributed to the national solar
rollout targets. This does not reflect deliberative assessment of the many other potential
benefits of small-scale solar plants, nor provides positive sanctions to support their growth
beyond removing an existing legislative obstacle. Community solar energy plants can, for
instance, enable revenue sharing, contribute to energy flexibility by matching prosumers and
users with complementary energy demand profiles, forego investments in expensive and
carbon-intensive new grid infrastructure and reduce electricity transmission losses. Yet
space for such discussions has not been ‘opened up’ as a core part of energy transition
metrics. Such a reductive focus is fairly typical of climate mitigation metrics (Krabbe et al.,
2015), and lacks adequate contextualisation in terms of socio-spatial effects. This finding
supports scholarly claims that metrics and assessment are closely intertwined Loconto and
Hatanaka, 2018), while highlighting the folly of accepting such equivalence at face value.
False equivalence means that in practice, forms of new solar capacity that have corporate
ownership (large-scale plants of many MW worth many millions of Euro) are treated the
same as forms that have individual or community ownership (in tens or hundreds of KW)
and can be built closer to electricity demand. There is scope to incentivise the latter through
positive sanctions – such as financial incentives and revenue sharing models – in recognition
of the above characteristics (Allan et al., 2011; Funkhouser et al., 2015). Wide public
Table 3. Policy insights based on acountability analysis of solar energy transition in Portugal.
LASH matrix Sanctions No sanctions
Deliberative
assessment
(S) -> Support and replicate
- Technocratic legitimation: regulate
implementation in line with
national solar targets
- Bureaucratic legitimation: decommission
activities that undermine solar targets
(H) -> Challenge and mobilise
- No discernable instance during
the period under study
No deliberative
assessment
(A) -> Criticise and metricise
- Discursive legitimation: deconstruct the
basis for solar energy transition targets
(L) -> Regulate and democratise
- Financial legitimation: treat
differently scaled solar energy
plants as non-commensurable
L: laissez faire tendencies: A: authoritarianism: S: strong accountability: H: hollow accountability.
Source: combined and adapted from Sareen and Wolf (2020) and Sareen (2020a).
Note: updated from Table 1.
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discussion that goes beyond ‘the commensurability of carbon’ (Dalsgaard, 2013) could serve
as a basis to legitimate and institute new metrics that address this issue by attributing value
to the social benefits that accompany more distributed solar energy rollout.
Authoritarianism
Imposition of ambitious energy transition targets (discursive legitimation). The metrics mobilised in
support of the rapid decarbonisation plan in Portugal were rather front loaded. The
Ministry of Environment and Energy Transition (and later the Ministry for the
Environment and Climate Action) took point of departure in the Paris Agreement and in
scientific models in order to draft the National Energy and Climate Plan 2030 and the
Roadmap for Carbon Neutrality 2050. These were thereafter taken on a road show, and
‘opened up’ for public comment, but prior to this, the broad lines had been drawn, and the
overarching direction and scale of ambition was no longer subject to discussion – it had
already been ‘closed down’ (Stirling, 2008). While this can be said to have been the outcome
of expert assessment, this is distinct from deliberative assessment with wider publics, à la the
point by Star (1999) to consider indicators in terms of their epistemological status. While
the timing for this institutionalisation of targets at the end of 2018 proved opportune for the
Portuguese government, with the incumbent coalition reelected in late 2019 and thus con-
solidating power, Portugal began to find fiscal space squeezed once again due to the effects
of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. The commitment to ambitious decarbonisation targets
thus constitutes a ‘green authoritarian’ measure (cf. Carter, 1996) that has enabled the
discursive legitimation of measures such as solar auctions for aggressive solar rollout.
I am reminded here that Bowker and Star (1999) caution that who defines and measures
is political, and in this instance, governmental bodies firmly took the lead in retaining
control in these regards. While positive from a climate perspective, such an approach none-
theless runs the risk of setting a precedent for future actions that may have less salutary
effects, from an environmental or socioeconomic perspective. Thus it is notable that metrics
that enable a low-carbon energy transition are not necessarily based on strong accountabil-
ity relations, but can instead be the product of top-down energy policy. China is often cited
as such an example globally (e.g. Beeson, 2010), but similar traits are in evidence in this
Western European country.
Strong accountability
Regulated solar auction mechanism (technocratic legitimation). The emergence and institutionalisa-
tion of metrics for allocation of limited grid capacity for solar energy rollout was the most
laudable achievement of Portugal’s solar energy transition during the study period. This
finding resonates with the observation by Heinrichs and Schuster (2017) that the institu-
tionalisation of sustainability is visible early on in metrics and indicators. The market-based
mechanism of solar auctions has in recent years become a tried and tested way to establish
competitive prices for this renewable energy source globally. In the Portuguese case, this was
used in a context-specific manner, with apt adjustments made ahead of the second auction.
This makes the market mechanism regulated, purpose-driven and adaptive, with a basis in
the national solar energy targets and in governing the energy sector in the public interest. In
this sense, it ‘opens up’ for change, while ‘closing down’ some possibilities of an unfettered
market-based approach. Specific characteristics include the ceiling for solar tariffs in the
first auction (which ensured competitive bids), the allocation of lots ahead of the auction
(which matched grid availability and gave solar developers a realistic planning horizon) and
the introduction of a hybrid solar-and-storage option for the second auction. The success of
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the auctions can thus be credited to the bureaucratic legitimation of the process led by the
ministry. This legitimation was backed up through the interest shown by the hundreds of
solar developers who registered for the solar auctions. This closely intertwined nature of the
epistemic practices and sociotechnical changes that constructed the solar sector anew chimes
well with reflections by Jensen et al. (2017), who emphasise the performative power of
metrics that features so prominently here.
Wrapping up scope for speculative investment (bureaucratic legitimation). An equally important
metric to match the successful auction mechanism was the decommissioning of a less trans-
parent mechanism for solar plant licensing that was in place until 2018 (see Sareen, 2020b).
The new ministry inherited a long list of queued investors and pre-allocated solar licenses
from its institutional predecessor; many of these licenses had been extended beyond the
original two years of validity. Ahead of the first solar auctions held in July 2019, the min-
istry resolved those solar licenses that had not been honoured, and freed up the grid capacity
associated with them. Solar developers generally saw this ‘closing down’ as a positive devel-
opment, as it prevented speculative investment that would otherwise have driven up their
costs in the solar segment. The state saw this consolidation as being in the public interest, as
any speculative tendencies would eventually have resulted in higher costs for solar energy
which would in turn have been passed on to citizens. While this sort of bureaucratic process
rarely makes headlines the same way as energy transition targets, it rests on a key metric:
respecting the two-year deadline to build solar capacity upon receiving a license. For
Portugal to grow the solar energy segment in line with its ambitious targets by 2030,
preventing delays is an essential concern. The ability of the present analytical approach
to capture this shift underscores the strength of a relational approach over a structural
one (cf.Bouzarovski and Haarstad, 2019; Clemens and Cook, 1999). Rather than taking
formal aspects (like the granted licenses) as a given, examining the shifting roles and incen-
tives of actors in entanglement provides a more granular account of sectoral changes and
their underlying rationale, or what Mahoney and Thelen (2009) theorise as processes of
institutional change in terms of agency and power.
Hollow accountability
It is a testament to the impressive achievement of the Portuguese solar energy transition
between October 2018 and August 2020 that this study found no apparent instances of
hollow accountability. In other words, wherever there was deliberative assessment of the
solar rollout, it was followed up with sanctions. The most pertinent instance of this concerns
community energy legislation, which the reelected government proceeded to enact and bring
into force in January 2020. It was not yet possible, within the study period, to ascertain the
extent to which this change would be effective in enabling community solar energy plants to
proliferate. Moreover, it remains indeterminate whether these will in fact more directly
benefit citizens who engage in solar prosuming. In hindsight, this may come to constitute
an instance of hollow accountability, but it may equally become a model for how to bring
about multi-scalar, citizen-centric solar energy transitions. Thus, to ensure even-handed
treatment, this matter is left open-ended in this study.
The above characterisations of the accountability relations in play as four types of dis-
crete practices of legitimation show that accountability is not inherent to energy systems,
nor to the political-administrative paraphernalia through which these energy systems are
reproduced, reconfigured and maintained. Even as their technical basis changes, the sys-
temic logics of energy systems retain aspects that have a political economic basis justified
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not of technical necessity, but rather in the socio-cultural domains where they are legitimat-
ed. Accountability is always in the making, and energy transitions present a conjuncture
where relations are reconfigured. The accountability relations above undergird each discrete
practice of legitimation. They enact outcomes that may well diverge from the intended
outcomes of sustainability metrics as expressed through visions such as national plans
(Jasanoff, 2007), but in turn also shape the implementation and evolution of these metrics.
Accountability relations vary based on the extent to which these metrics are specified and
backed up, and on how they are modulated by actors who are able to strategically establish,
manoeuvre or co-opt the discretionary room they afford. Legitimating power thus influen-
ces accountability relations and is constitutive of sectoral change.
The legitimating power of sustainability metrics
The analysis reveals the institutionalisation of sustainability metrics in a direction that
supports socially equitable effects of low-carbon transition in the form of solar energy in
line with rollout targets in Portugal, but suggests scope for further intervention. Such inter-
vention is required due to the scalar biases inherent during rollout (Essletzbichler, 2012), as
the energy system shifts from top-down logics to modularity. Incumbents enjoy positions of
privilege that they are able to leverage to act strategically and rapidly (Avelino et al., 2016;
Meadowcroft, 2009). Meanwhile, new entrants and smaller actors are held back not so much
by economies of scale but by lack of legal and regulatory support for bottom-up, small-scale
rollout, a situation that is itself evolving in tandem with metricisation (Aiken, 2017; Hughes
et al., 2020; Madanipour, 2017). The privileging of large actors bears notable similarities to
Portugal’s wind energy rollout in the decades immediately prior, where grid connection
licenses were auctioned, resulting in the dominance of large actors in the sector. As scholars
have noted previously, Portuguese decision-making in environmental policy displays distinct
traits of being centralised, technocratic and disengaged from public participation while
going through the motions of consultative and accountability-related processes
(Gonçalves, 2002; Gonçalves and Delicado, 2009). In these ways, Portugal’s solar rollout
reflects some historical continuity.
Table 3 provides an overview of key evidence-based energy policy insights for solar
rollout in Portugal, as a summary form of the preceding findings and discussion. It
shows that strong accountability relations are evident in the Portuguese solar energy tran-
sition in the technocratic and bureaucratic practices of legitimation. However, there is a
need for greater deliberative assessment when it comes to target-setting, where an author-
itarian tendency can be criticised and backed by a call to deconstruct the basis for metri-
cisation. Moreover, there is a need to differentiate between scales of solar rollout and
regulate them through distinct sanctions in order to democratise the effects of solar
energy transitions for citizens.
In closing, I reflect on ways in which the outcome of this study is instructive for scholars
working on the socio-spatial effects of energy transitions. The emerging field of critical
renewabilities, broadly speaking the social and spatial turn in energy research, tends to
focus on how low-carbon energy transitions are reproducing or exacerbating existing injus-
tices (e.g. Bridge, 2018; Healy and Barry, 2017). This is certainly an important concern. But
for scholars who study low-carbon transitions, this would in itself be a limited and limiting
focus, in terms of enabling critical insight and producing actionable knowledge to inform
the governance of these transitions (Care et al., 2021; Kirchhoff et al., 2013). The
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‘legitimating power’ approach – focusing on the power to influence accountability relations –
presents a way of engaging relationally with transitions (Mahoney and Thelen, 2009) such as
solar rollout. It enables one to identify specific actions and actors that contribute to terri-
torialisation through practices of legitimation (Sareen, 2020a), and critique the bases of
legitimacy (Sareen and Wolf, 2020) that lead such territorialisation to have unjust socio-
spatial effects, thus generating actionable knowledge in a context-specific way based on
ongoing assessment.
The relationship between low-carbon transitions and their justice effects on energy sys-
tems is modulated politically and economically through ‘legitimating power’. I have shown
above that unpicking how this power legitimates the ‘opening up’ and ‘closing down’ of
specific socio-spatial effects (Stirling, 2008) during low-carbon transitions, by focusing on
metrics (Bowker and Star, 1999; Star, 1999), can be an even-handed approach to analysing
energy transitions in terms of their implications for accountability. This analytical approach
can enable rigorous analysis of the way political economic contestation is legitimated
through practices in socio-cultural domains in order to implement a particular version of
technological rollout to achieve low-carbon transitions. In the Portuguese case, the legiti-
mating power of sustainability metrics ‘opened up’ space to propel large-scale solar rollout,
while keeping some possibilities for small-scale solar plants ‘closed down’ during the study
period. The more evenly we can distribute legitimating power through an informed politics
of transition, the more likely just transitions become.
Highlights
• Analyses implementation of solar energy transition metrics in Portugal 2018–2020.
• Examines impact of national plans for rapid energy decarbonisation on social equity.
• Combines two analytical frameworks to analyse the legitimating power of metrics.
• Offers empirically grounded account of sustainability metrics for just transitions.
• Assesses multi-scalar legitimating practices that implement sustainability metrics.
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1. Documents examined during desk study include governmental reports mainly by the Directorate
General for Energy and Geology (www.dgeg.gov.pt/pt/areas-setoriais/energia/) and Energy
Services Regulatory Authority (www.erse.pt/inicio/); major plan documents, e.g. the National
Energy and Climate Plan 2030 (https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/pt_final_
necp_main_en.pdf) and the Roadmap for Carbon Neutrality 2050 (https://descarbonizar2050.apam
biente.pt/en/roadmap/); industry reports, especially by the Portuguese Association of Renewable
Energy (www.apren.pt); online media coverage, notably on the solar energy focused platform PV
Magazine (www.pv-magazine.com/region/portugal/) and in national news outlets; coverage of solar
energy related events during the study period; and peer-reviewed literature on solar energy in
Portugal. All links last accessed on 29 April 2021.
2. As per the final National Energy and Climate Plan 2030 for Portugal, dated 31 December 2019.
3. For instance, see this article in PV Magazine entitled ‘Portuguese government confirms world
record solar price of $0.01316/kWh’ dated 27 August 2020, accessed on 29 April 2021 at: www.
pv-magazine.com/2020/08/27/portuguese-government-confirms-world-record-solar-price-of-0-
01316-kwh/
4. For indicative details of some events, see the Solar Market Parity Portugal programme (https://
portugal.solarplaza.com/program-2019), the Sun Day hosted by APREN (www.apren.pt/pt/apren/
eventos-apren/dia-do-sol-2018) and the Energy Forum webpage (http://ambienteonline.pt/1forum
energia/) and an event report (www.inesctec.pt/en/news/inesc-tec-participates-in-the-1st-energy-
forum-dedicated-to-the-energy-transition). All links last accessed on 29 April 2021.
5. For details, see https://lisboaenova.org/ (Lisboa Enova) and https://proseu.eu (PROSEU).
6. Hindsight bears out this clear trend that emerged during the study period, with strong sectoral
growth during 2020–2021 in both PPAs and large-scale solar PV projects that is beyond the scope of
this paper.
7. For details of performance by Coopernico and GoParity, see www.coopernico.org/ and https://
goparity.com respectively.
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